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ENHANCED VALUE OF A CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATION AT THE TIME OF
DIVORCE: WHAT ROLE WILL
WISCONSIN'S MARITAL PROPERTY
ACT PLAY?
Dave managed and was the majority shareholder of a
closely held corporation. He had inherited the stock of the
corporation from his father. Carol and Dave were married in
March of 1986.1 During their marriage, Dave received a sal-
1. The hypothetical posed at the outset of this article assumes that the parties do
not have a marital property agreement concerning the husband's interest in the closely
held corporation. It is further assumed that the husband did not execute a statement
unilaterally designating income from the corporation as his individual property pursu-
ant to 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 122r (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.59). A marital
property agreement or unilateral statement could alter the parties' interest in the corpo-
ration. This Comment does not deal with the possible consequences of such an action
by the parties.
The hypothetical corporation's stock would be classified as property generally ex-
empt from division at the time of divorce by section 767.255 of the Wisconsin Statutes
and as individual property. Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(6) (1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1985).
Section 767.255 governs the treatment of property at the time of dissolution. Under this
statute the stock would, at least initially, be considered the separate property of the
husband. The section provides, in part, that:
Any property shown to have been acquired by either party prior to or during
the course of the marriage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have been
paid for by either party with funds so acquired shall remain the property of such
party and may not be subjected to a property division under this section except
upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship on the
other party or on the children of the marriage, and in that event the court may
divest the party of such property in a fair and equitable manner.
Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84).
Section 766.31 governs the classification of property under Wisconsin's Marital
Property Act. Under this section the stock would be classified as individual, separate,
property because it was owned before the marriage which occurred after January 1,
1986. Section 766.316(6) provides that: [p]roperty owned at a marriage which occurs
after 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 1986, is individual property of the owning spouse if, at
the marriage, the spouse has a marital domicile in this state." Wis. STAT. § 766.31(6)
(1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1986), as amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 37.
Even if the stock had been acquired after the marriage, it would still be classified as
individual, separate, property under section 766.31. Section 766.31(7)(a) provides, in
part, that:
(7) Property acquired by a spouse during marriage and after the determina-
tion date is individual property if acquired by any of the following means:
(a) By gift during lifetime or by a disposition at death by a 3rd person to that
spouse and not to both spouses. . ..
Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(a) (1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1986).
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ary from the corporation.2 The value of the corporation's
stock increased over the course of the marriage. This increase
was due, in part, to Dave's efforts. A divorce action is now
pending between Carol and Dave. All of the above facts oc-
curred in Wisconsin.
Query: Is the community entitled to a portion of the en-
hanced value of the corporation's stock?
What role, if any, will Chapter 766 play in this scenario?3
If the court would choose to look at community property
principles for guidance, which principles would be material?
The hypothetical outlined above presents one of the most
difficult areas of property classification practitioners face in a
community property state.4 Difficulties arise because this situ-
ation brings two general principles of community property
law into conflict. One, the intrinsic increase in value of sepa-
rate property remains separate.5 This is true whether the in-
come from a spouse's separate property is classified as
separate or community property.6 Two, "anything produced
by the time, talent or labor of either spouse is community
property."7
The fundamental issue raised by this conflict of principles
is "whether the increased or enhanced value of the [separate
property] closely held business interest should be character-
ized as separate or community property or whether the com-
munity has a right of reimbursement as a result of the
increased or enhanced value of the closely held business inter-
2. The income received during the marriage would constitute marital property.
Section 766.31(4) provides that "[e]xcept as provided under subs. (7) (a), (7p) and (10),
income earned or accrued by a spouse or attributable to property of a spouse during
marriage and after the determination date is marital property." Wis. STAT. § 766.31(4)
(1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1986), as amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 37.
3. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
4. Weekley, Appreciation of a Closely-Held Business Interest Owned Prior to Mar-
riage - Is It Separate or Community?, 9 COMM. PROP. J. 261 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Weekley I].
5. W. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES,
§ 6:18, at 359 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MCCLANAHAN].
6. Id.
7. Comment,Closely Held Corporations in the Wake of Vallone: Enhancement of
Stock Value by Community Time, Talent and Labor, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 47, 47 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Enhancement of Stock Value].
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est. ''8  Courts in community property states have been trou-
bled by this issue for years.9
This Comment will begin by identifying the origins of Wis-
consin's Marital Property Act in an effort to determine which
of the eight community property states to look to for guidance
on this subject. Section II will outline some of the actions
taken by these states. Finally, the Wisconsin statutes will be
examined in light of these findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Origins of Wisconsin's Marital Property Act
Wisconsin's Marital Property Act"° is based upon the Uni-
form Marital Property Act (UMPA). The Uniform Marital
Property Act has been referred to as "a community property
act.' 2 Although UMPA is not expressly identified as a com-
munity property act within the Act itself, its community prop-
erty roots are acknowledged in the prefatory note.
Some of the root concepts can be traced to the sharing
ideal which is at the center of the historical community
property approach. The fundamental principle that owner-
ship of all of the economic rewards from the personal effort
8. Featherston & Trail, Enhanced Value of Closely-Held Stock, Community or Sep-
arate: Closer to a Solution, 47 TEX. B. J. 128, 128 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Feather-
ston & Trail].
9. Id. at 130.
10. 1983 Wis. Laws 186 (effective January 1, 1986). [hereinafter cited as Chapter
766].
11. Wis. Laws Reference Bureau, Informational Bulletin 84-lB-1, at 1 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Informational Bulletin].
12. Reppy, The Uniform Marital Property Act: Some Suggested Revisions for a Ba-
sically Sound Act, 21 Hous. L. REv. 679, 679 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Suggested
Revisions]. See also Report on a Regional Conference on Community Property Law, 9
COMM. PROP. J. 149 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regional Report]. "[T]he proposed
Uniform Marital Property Act, which, regardless of semantical distinctions, is really an
attempt to bring about an improved total community property system for all of the
United States - including existing community property jurisdictions." Id. at 150 (em-
phasis in original); Kornfeld, UMPA: The Uniform Marital Property Act, 4 EQurr. DIs-
TRIBUrION REP., 61.
Make no mistake about it, UMPA is a community property proposal-the prin-
cipal purpose of which is to recognize that most property acquired during mar-
riage, however titled, becomes immediately co-owned by the spouses, with such
co-ownership rights being already in existence at the termination of the marriage




of each spouse during marriage is shared by the spouses in
vested, present, and equal interests is the heart of the com-
munity property system. It is also the heart of the Uniform
Marital Property Act. 13
The informational material connected with Chapter 766
acknowledges that the Act represents a "new system of prop-
erty rights [which] embodies many principles of community
property." 14
It should be noted, however, that Chapter 766 does not
refer to the terms "community property" and "separate prop-
erty." Property has been labeled in Chapter 766 as it was in
UMPA: marital 15 or individual. 16
In light of the acknowledged roots of UMPA, the choice
of these labels has been criticized as being misleading. 17 Pro-
fessor William A. Reppy, Jr. observed that the term "marital
property" has acquired a settled meaning in many common
law and community property states. 18 In common law states
"'[m]arital' property refers to property that is separately
owned by one spouse during marriage yet is divisible at di-
13. Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at 48.
14. Id. at 1.
The act creates a new system of property rights applicable to property owned by
spouses during a marriage. Under the common law property system previously
applicable in this state, any person, including a married person, who "owns" a
particular item of property by virtue of having brought, earned or otherwise
received it has an exclusive property interest in and complete control over that
property. Under this act, much of the property "owned" by one or both spouses
is marital property and is subject to the property interests and control rights of
both husband and wife.
Id.
15. Wis. STAT. § 766.31(l) (1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1986). See infra note 20 for
text.
16. Wis. STAT. § 766.31(6), (7) (1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1986), as amended by
1985 Wis. Laws 37. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
17. Suggested Revisions, supra note 12, at 682-83. "There simply is no reason to
reject the historic terms 'community' and 'separate' property when enacting what is
clearly a community property regime." Id. at 689.
18. Id. at 682.
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vorce "19 This meaning is different from that embodied
in UMPA and Chapter 766.20
19. Id. Marital property is not defined in WIs. STAT. § 767.255; however, the only
property, absent a showing of hardship, excluded from division is property that was a
gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or purchased with proceeds from such property.
The term individual, or separate, property is not used in § 767.255. One result
might be that different types of individual property could be treated differently under
§ 767.255. The possible difference in treatment has been noted.
Property brought to the marriage, whether inherited or acquired by other means,
and property acquired by gift or inheritance after marriage are classified by the
Act as individual property without distinction. §§ 766.31(6) and 766.31(7)(a).
However, although classified the same during marriage, these two types of prop-
erty are treated differently at dissolution. Property brought to the marriage
which was not acquired by gift or inheritance is within the marital estate subject
to division under § 766.255, although the extent of such property is one of the
factors considered in awarding one spouse a greater share of the estate.
§ 766.255(2). The property acquired byone spouse by gift or inheritance before
or after the marriage is excluded and is awarded to the recipient unless it would
be a hardship to the other to do so.
2 K. CHRISTIANSEN, F. WM. HABERMAN, J. HAYDON, D. KINNAMON, M. MC-
GARITY, M. WILCOX, MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN §§ 11.2c-.2d, at 11-5
to 11-6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN]. (The
section numbers above are in error in the original and should read 767.255 and
767.255(2) respectively).
20. A comparison of Wisconsin Statute section 767.255 with section 766.31 indi-
cates that the "pool" of property excluded from marital property is potentially larger
under section 766.31 classifications. WiS. STAT. § 766.31 classification of property of
spouses, provides:
(1) All property of spouses is marital property except that which is classified
otherwise by this chapter.
(2) All property of spouses is presumed to be marital property.
(3) Each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in each item of marital
property, but the marital property interest of the nonemploye spouse in a de-
ferred employment benefit plan terminates at the death of the nonemploye
spouse if he or she predeceases the employe spouse.
(4) Except as provided under subs. (7)(a), (7p) and (10), income earned or ac-
crued by a spouse or attri-butable to property of a spouse during marriage and
after the determination date is marital property.
(5) The transfer of property to a trust does not by itself change the classification
of the property.
(6) Property owned at a marriage which occurs after 12:01 a.m. on January 1,
1986, is individual property of the owning spouse if, at the marriage, the spouse
has a marital domicile in this state.
(7) Property acquired by a spouse during marriage and after the determination
date is individual property if acquired by any of the following means:
(a) By gift during lifetime or by a disposition at death by a 3rd person to that
spouse and not to both spouses. A distribution of principal or income from a
trust created by a 3rd person to one spouse is the individual property of that
spouse unless the trust provides otherwise.




Concern has been voiced by some that refusal to use the
term "community property" may create problems for practi-
tioners. Professor Reppy has speculated that "special rules in
the Internal Revenue Code and regulations that apply to com-
munity property" may be overlooked by attorneys because of
UMPA's labeling.2' In addition, he points out that another
potential problem area is the "possibility that bench and bar
might believe that cases from community property states
should not be cited as precedents. ' 22  In Professor Reppy's
opinion, this is simply not accurate. The possible confusion
which might be caused by the use of the words marital and
individual rather than community and separate may have
been eliminated by the enactment on October 22, 1985, of
(c) From appreciation of the spouse's individual property except to the extent
that the appreciation is classified as marital property under s. 766.63.
(d) By a decree, marital property agreement or reclassification under sub. (10)
designating it as the individual property of the spouse.
(e) As a recovery for damage to property under s. 766.70, except as specifically
provided otherwise in a decree or marital property agreement.
(f) As a recovery for personal injury except for the amount of that recovery
attributable to expenses paid or otherwise satisfied from marital property and
except for the amount attributable to loss of income during marriage.
(7p) Income attributable to all or specified property other than marital property,
with respect to which a spouse has executed under s. 766.59 a statement unilater-
ally designating that income as his or her individual property, is individual
property.
(8) Except as provided otherwise in this chapter, the enactment of this chapter
does not alter the classification and ownership rights of property acquired before
the determination date or the classification and ownership rights of property ac-
quired after the determination date in exchange for or with the proceeds of prop-
erty acquired before the determination date.
(9) Except as provided otherwise in this chapter and except to the extent that it
would affect the spouse's ownership rights in the property existing before the
determination date, during marriage the interest of a spouse in property owned
immediately before the determination date is treated as if it were individual
property.
(10) Spouses may reclassify their property by gift, marital property agreement,
written consent under s. 766.61(3)(e) or unilateral statement under s. 766.59. If
a spouse gives property to the other spouse and intends at the time the gift is
made that the property be the individual property of the donee spouse, the in-
come from the property is the individual property of the donee spouse unless a
contrary intent of the donor spouse regarding the classification of income is
established.
Wis. STAT. § 766.31 (1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1986). (Wis. STAT. §§ 766.31(3), (4),
(5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) appear as amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 37. Section 766.31 (7p)
was created by 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 81m).
21. Suggested Revisions, supra note 9, at 688.
22. Id.
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Wisconsin Senate Bill 150. This "trailer bill" states that "[ilt
is the intent of the legislature that marital property is a form
of community property. 23
Given the underpinnings of UMPA and Chapter 766,
community property states can be a source of information as
Wisconsin courts grapple with this "new system of property
rights." 24 Caution must be used, however, in selecting cases
from community property states. "While common law practi-
tioners tend to think in terms of a single community property
system operating in Arizona, California, Idaho, Lousiana, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington, there is consider-
able diversity from community property state to community
property state .... "25 The question then becomes which
state or states to look to as possible sources of information.
B. Civil Law Rule versus American Rule
As stated previously, Chapter 766 is based on UMPA.26
The Uniform Marital Property Act adopted "the civil law rule
that rents and profits of separate property are community
property if they accrue during marriage. ' 27 The civil law sys-
tem is also refered to as the Spanish law system. Under the
Spanish law system of community property, the fruits29 and
profits of separate property belong to the community, regard-
less of whether the separate property was acquired before or
23. 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 68 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.001(2)). The legis-
lative note accompanying this section is as follows:
NOTE: Expressly states that it is the intent of the legislature that marital
property is a form of community property. The special committee concluded
that an express statement of that intent is important for purposes of the applica-
tion of other law, such as federal tax law, federal law relating to equal access to
credit and federal law relating to deferred employment benefits.
1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 68 note.
24. Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at 1.
25. Regional Report, supra note 12, at 149.
26. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
27. Suggested Revisions, supra note 12, at 698.
28. W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES,
131 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as REPPY & SAMUEL]. See generally MCCLANA-
HAN, supra note 5, at §§ 2:27 -39 (overview of some of the theories and terms applicable
in states following the civil law system).
29. "Civil Fruits. In the civil law (fructus civiles) are such things as the rents and
income of real property, the interest on money loaned, and annuities. Rents and reve-
nues of an immovable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 603 (5th ed. 1979).
[Vol. 69:82
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during the marriage.3 ° Wisconsin, Idaho, Louisiana and
Texas follow this civil law rule with slight deviations.3'
This is in contrast to the American rule, under which
"rents and profits have the same separate character as the pro-
ductive property except to the extent there is an apportion-
ment for labor of either spouse that helped generate the
profit."' 32 California, Nevada, Washington, Arizona and New
Mexico follow the American rule for apportioning the income
from separate property.33
30. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 71,
at 160 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN].
This was based on the conception that, although each spouse retained ownership
of his or her separate property, each unselfishly and unhesitantly had at heart the
success and well-being of the marital union and that, accordingly, the fruits and
income of all property of each naturally were to be devoted to the benefit of the
marital union.
Id. at 161.
31. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 28, at 131. "Louisiana adheres to this system,
except where a spouse opts out of it by filing a declaration that he or she claims rents
and profits from his or her separate property as separate property." Wisconsin has
provided spouses with the same option in section 766.31(7p). This section allows a
spouse to unilaterally designate as individual property the income from their property
that is other than marital. 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 81m (to be codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 766.31 (7p)). See supra note 20 for text. Idaho follows the civil law system:
[U]nless (1) the instrument conveying separate property to H or W specifies that
rents and profits will also be separate or (2) H and W so agree in writing. In-
come from property given by one spouse to the other remains community unless
the donor-spouse specifically states in the instrument of conveyance that the in-
come is to be separate.
IDAHO CODE §. 32-906 (1983).
"Texas is basically a civil law rule state. However, .. [i]f one spouse makes a gift
of property to the other spouse, that gift is presumed to include all the income or prop-
erty which might arise from that gift of property. TEx. CONST. art. XVI § 15, as
amended 1980." Id.
The same result has been achieved in Wisconsin with the amendment to section
766.31(10) in 1985 Wis. Laws 37. The legislative note to 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 83 is as
follows:
NOTE: Clarifies that the income from an interspousal gift, the principle of
which the donee spouse intends at the time the gift is made to be the individual
property of the donee spouse, is also the individual property of the donee spouse
unless a contrary intent of the donor spouse is established. The special commit-
tee concluded that the provision reflects what, in most instances, a donor spouse
intends with respect to the classification of income from such property. The
special committee also concluded that it is important to allow the donor spouse
to implement a contrary intent.
1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 83 note.




In both civil law states and American rule states, the natu-
ral increase in the value of separate property is separate. 34
Gain that can be attributed to either spouse's labor is, how-
ever, an asset of the community in all community property
jurisdictions.35 Once it has been determined that gain has re-
sulted from both of these factors, natural increase and labor, it
becomes necessary to allocate a portion of the gain to both the
community and the separate estates. In order to do this fairly,
some system of apportionment must be used.36 A variety of
apportionment systems exist;37 furthermore, individual state
courts may use a number of different systems rather than re-
stricting themselves to only one or two methods.38
Segregation of increases "consisting of separate rents and
profits" from those resulting from labor is required in states
following the American rule in which the rents and profits of
separate property remain separate.3 9 While the issue of appor-
tionment may not be as apparent in civil law states as it is in
American rule states, problems can still occur.4° Apportion-
ment problems can and do exist in civil law states; it is only
that the interests being segregated are slightly different be-
34. Id. at 131-32. This concept is evident in the Wisconsin statute pertaining to the
classification of property. WIs. STAT. § 766.31(7) (c) provides that property is individ-
ual to the extent it is derived: "From appreciation of the spouse's individual property
except to the extent that the appreciation is classified as marital property under s.
766.63." (this section corresponds to § 4(g)(3) of UMPA).
35. Adler, Arizona's All-or-NothingApproach to the Classification of Gain from Sep-
arate Property: High Time for a Change, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 597, 597 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Adler].
36. Id. at 606.
37. See King, The Challenge of Apportionment, 37 WAsH. L. REV. 483 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as King]. King identifies what he considers to be ten different systems
of apportionment. See generally Adler, supra note 35. Adler identifies six systems of
apportionment in his article. Semantics can be a problem as a comparison of these two
articles points out. The two authors, at times, use different labels to identify similar
systems. For example, King uses the term "salary system" and Adler uses the term
"segregation test" to identify similar systems. Although both articles concentrate pri-
marly on American rule states, their descriptions of the various systems are helpful to
an understanding of apportionment. As Reppy and Samuel note, civil law states have
apportionment problems, too. These problems are not, however, as well recognized as
they are in American rule states. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 28, at 155.
38. King, supra note 37, at 485. "Courts of one state often refer to, and adopt,
methods from other states. Furthermore, courts within a single state may utilize differ-
ent formulae and courts have stated that they may utilize any system whatever." Id.
39. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 28, at 132.
40. Id. at 155.
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cause rents and profits from separate property are community
property.41 Civil law states require a separation of gains re-
sulting from the natural increase in value which is separate
property, from "rents, profits and return on labor," which is
community property. 42 Caution must be used when applying
apportionment methods used in American rule states because
the estates that are being segregated in the two community
property systems are different.43
In light of the basic difference between treatment of rents
and profits under the civil law rule and the American rule,
and the aforestated fact that Chapter 766 follows the civil law
rule, this analysis will focus on the states of Idaho, Louisiana
and Texas to determine their courts' treatment of a spouse's
separate property interests in a closely held corporation at the
dissolution of a marriage.44
II. STATES FOLLOWING THE CIVIL LAW RULE
This section will outline some of the decisions from Idaho,
Louisiana and Texas involving the enhanced value of a closely
held corporation which was the separate property of one of
the spouses.
41. Suggested Revisions, supra note 12, at 702-03.
42. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 28, at 132.
43. Suggested Revisions, supra note 12, at 702-03. Professor Reppy discussed ap-
portionment approaches analogous to Van Camp (derived from Van Camp v. Van
Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921)) and Pereira (Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1,
103 P. 488 (1909)). In the former, "the community return is fixed by specific calcula-
tions and the separate share of gain 'floats'. This formula best benefits the separate
estate if the gain is unusually large." In the latter, "[t]he community share 'floats', and
thus this approach best benefits the community estate if the gain is unusually large; the
separate estate benefits by this method if the gain is modest." Id. at 702.
In California, the courts choose which apportion-ment formula to apply by de-
termining whether separate capital or community labor was the factor primarily
responsible for the gain. The applicable "capital" factor is gain occuring without
any labor. This factor raises no apportionment problem even if the asset was
bought with the intention of reselling for profit. Under the UMPA's civil law
approach, however, what California treats as "capital" must be broken down into
natural appreciation and profit componentm Thus, the "chief contributing factor"
test cannot be borrowed automatically from California
Id. at 702-03 (emphasis added).
44. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 28, at 131. Idaho, Louisiana and Texas are the
only community property states that consider the rents and profits of separate property




In Gapsch v. Gapsch4 5 the Supreme Court of Idaho set
forth several rules concerning the enhancement in value of
separate property. Natural enhancement in value was de-
clared to be separate.4 6 If separate property was improved
with "community efforts, labor, industry or funds," the com-
munity would be entitled to reimbursement from the separate
estate.47 Armed with these rules and Idaho's statutory defini-
tions of separate48 and community property,4 9 the court set
out to deal with the issue of whether a spouse was entitled to
share in the increased value of a close corporation in Speer v.
Quinlan.50
A brief sketch of the financial picture in Speer is helpful to
gain an understanding of the interests at stake. Raymond
Speer was the majority stockholder of Speer, Inc., owning
65% of the stock.51 At the time of the trial court's decision,
Speer was president of the corporation. 5  The trial court
made several findings concerning the value of the stock and
the corporation. From 1965 to 1971, the book value of the
stock had increased $718.43 per share; the corporation's mar-
ket value had increased $1,160,000 between 1964 and 1971.13
Speer, Inc. had never declared a dividend nor issued a stock
45. 76 Idaho 34, 277 P.2d 278 (1954).
46. Id. at -, 277 P.2d at 282-83.
47. Id. at -, 277 P.2d at 282. "As a general rule where the separate property of
the husband is improved or his equity therein enhanced by community funds the com-
munity is entitled to be reimbursed from such separate estate unless such funds used for
improvement or enhancement are intended as a gift." Id.
48. IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (1983). (This section remains the same as the Idaho
Code in effect at the time of Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314 (1973)).
49. IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1983). The wording of this code section has been
changed slightly since the version of the Idaho Code used in Speer. The change did not
affect the status of income as community property. In the code section in force at the
time of Speer the wife could acquire separate property and keep the rents and profits as
her separate property if the conveying instrument so provided. The current version of
§ 32-906 extends this option to both spouses and further provides that the spouses can
by written agreement declare the rents and profits of separate property to be separate.
50. 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314 (1973).
51. Id. at , 525 P.2d at 317.
52. Id.
53. The Idaho Supreme Court in Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844
(1974), held that the market value of the corporation and not its book value must be
ascertained; book value reflects only a historical value and not a present day value. Id.
at -, 526 P.2d at 850.
[Vol. 69:82
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dividend.5 4 Furthermore, at the time of the trial the corpora-
tion had accumulated $339,493 of undistributed after-tax
earnings."
When the Supreme Court of Idaho surveyed the other
community property jurisdictions to discover how they handle
this issue, the court discovered conflicting authority and in-
consistent decisions. 6 What appeared to bother the court the
most, however, was the "artificial distinction made between a
separate property business organized in the form of a close
corporation and an unincorporated sole proprietorship or
partnership. '57 Some believe this distinction reflects the reluc-
tance of courts to pierce the corporate veil absent a showing
that the corporation is the spouse's alter ego or the establish-
ment of the perpetration of a fraud on the community.5 8
The court in Speer attempted to provide guidelines in cases
where a spouse's separate business benefits from community
efforts and ability. Of prime importance to the Idaho court
was the issue of whether the corporation had adequately com-
pensated Raymond Speer for his labor.5 9 This inquiry was
necessary to determine whether the correct balance between
separate and community interests had been achieved. That is,
if he had been adequately compensated it is less likely that
community property was retained by the corporation. A
number of factors which must be taken into consideration in
reaching this determination were set forth by the court:
"[T]he nature of the business, the size of the business, the
number of employees, the nature and extent of community in-
volvement in the conduct of the business, the growth pattern
54. If dividends had been distributed, they would have been community property.
Speer, 96 Idaho at -, 525 P.2d at 324.
55. Id. at , 525 P.2d at 317. As to the retention of earnings, it was acknowledged
that Mr. Speer's position as president and general manager gave him influence over the
decision of whether to retain the earnings or declare a dividend. However, there were
no allegations that the retention was unreasonable or was done to defraud the commu-
nity. Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 324.
56. Id. at , 525 P.2d at 321.
57. Id at , 525 P.2d at 321-22.
58. Featherston & Trail, supra note 8, at 133.
59. The court in Speer noted that a couple acquires both tangible and intangible
assets during a marriage. An important intangible asset is the ability of either spouse to
contribute to the community by their labor. The court concluded "that to the extent
that either spouse is rewarded for his or her labor during the marriage, such reward is
community property." Speer, 96 Idaho at , 525 P.2d at 323.
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of the business. (Did it steadily enhance in value? Did peri-
ods of prosperity alternate with periods of decline?)" 6  Once
these questions are dealt with, the court must determine
whether the compensation received was equivalent to that
which a non-owner employee would have been paid to per-
form the same services.61 In reaching this determination, the
salaries of individuals who are located in the same general ge-
ographical area and who possess similar skills and responsibil-
ities could be one factor to consider.62 If it is determined that
the community was not adequately compensated, the commu-
nity is entitled to a judgment equal to the difference between
actual compensation and that which would have been received
had there been just compensation.63 Conversely, if it is found
that the community was adequately compensated, the com-
munity has no further claim. 64
The corporation's retained earnings presented the court
with another problem.65 Again, the court established guide-
lines. It directed the trial court to determine the extent to
which the community would have benefited if the earnings
had been distributed.66 In order to do this, the trial court had
60. Id.
61. Id. The use of this criterion as a factor in determining whether the compensa-
tion received was adequate was criticized by Justice McFadden in his dissent in Speer:
"[E]valuation of Raymond Speer's compensation in comparison with other employees
would be doing a great injustice in not recognizing the actual contribution made by both
parties of the community to the increase in valuation of the separate property." Id. at
- 525 P.2d at 330. The trial court had found that Olive Speer had made a "substan-
tial contribution" to her husband's success through her role of wife and mother, in
addition to entertaining clients and business contacts.
62. Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 330. Cutbacks in salary resulting from the payoff of
corporate notes do not necessarily mean the individual was inadequately compensated;
the court must look at the overall compensation received including fringe benefits and
bonuses. Id. at _, 525 P.2d at 324.
63. Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 323. See also Gapsch, 76 Idaho at _ 277 P.2d at 283.
"The claim for reimbursement has been held to be in the nature of a charge or an
equitable lien against such separate property so improved. . . . [Tlhe measure of the
compensation generally is the increased value of the property due to the improvement."
Id.
64. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, § 6:18, at 359. "If an adequate salary is paid for
the management. . . there normally will not be any community claim to share in the
increased value of the business. . . ." Id.
65. Having never been distributed, the net earnings could not be labeled as income,
rents or profits. Speer, 96 Idaho at _ 525 P.2d at 324.
66. The Supreme Court of Idaho determined that the Speer community would have
received dividend distributions in proportion to Raymond Speer's ownership interest in
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to determine whether the retained net earnings figure was ac-
curate. In doing so, the trial court was to consider at least
two factors. First, the extent to which the community may be
entitled to additional compensation because Speer had origi-
nally been undercompensated for his labor. If it were found
that Speer and/or Luthy, the other employee stockholder, had
originally been undercompensated for their labor, the addi-
tional salary would have to be deducted from the corpora-
tion's income in the process of reaching the net earnings
figure.67 Second, the trial court was to give consideration "to-
ward the maintenance of the corporate solvency."
68
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that any procedure
designed to compensate for the detriment to the community
resulting from a retention of the earned surplus would be inex-
act. However, the court also recognized that any such "proce-
dure would be no more lacking in precision than awarding
damages for pain and suffering, which has been accomplished
satisfactorily by the courts for many years. "69
Retained earnings were handled differently in the Idaho
case of Simplot v. Simplot.70 In Simplot, the court refused to
include the retained earnings of J. R. Simplot Company as a
the corporation: 65%. The court noted that, "because of business exigencies, monies
that might otherwise have been distributed to the community as cash dividends, instead
remained in the business in which Raymond Speer holds a separate property ownership
interest." Id.
The Supreme Court of Idaho instructed the district court to "determine the extent
to which the community would have benefited, had 65% of the distributable earnings of
the corporation been received by the community in the form of dividends." Id.
The [Speer] court initially held that the retention of the earnings in the business
did not present a case of community funds being invested in a separate property
business and thus that no ownership interest in the business was received. How-
ever, the court did hold that under the discretionary division at divorce statute
applicable in Idaho, any inequity that the retention of income may have caused
could be rectified. This decision gives the wife the right to participate in the
accumulated income of a corporation during the time of the marriage.
I MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN, supra note 19, § 3.26(c) at 3-50.
67. Speer, 96 Idaho at - 525 P.2d at 324-25.
68. Id. at ._ 525 P.2d at 325.
69. Id. The Speer court noted that § 32-712 of the Idaho Code providing for the
discretionary division of community property was a device that could be used in this
situation.
70. 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844 (1974). The Simplot court chose to ignore the
treatment of retained earnings in Speer because a petition for rehearing had been
granted in Speer. Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 846 n.l. The petition for rehearing in Speer
involved a request for clarification on the types of job comparisons that are required in a
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factor to be considered in the division of property between the
spouses.7 1 The court noted that Don Simplot had "no legal
right to the retained earnings and. . . there [was] no guaran-
tee that they [would] ever become of economic benefit to
him." Therefore, they could not be labeled as income, rents
or profits.72 According to the court, the retention and rein-
vestment of the earnings in the business was a decision for the
corporation's directors, a decision in which the court refused
to "substitute its judgment for the business judgment of the
directors . . ."7
There are factual differences between Speer and Simplot
which could account for the court's reluctance to consider the
retained earnings in the latter case. Don Simplot was a mi-
nority shareholder in Apex Corporation, a corporation whose
sole function was to hold the shares of J. R. Simplot Com-
pany. Simplot's shares of J. R. Simplot Company, through his
shares of Apex, amount to "8.4% of the total ownership of J.
R. Simplot Company. ' 74  Furthermore, the trial court had
found that Simplot had been adequately compensated by the
corporation for his services.75 These facts may have caused
determination of adequate compensation. Speer, 96 Idaho at _, 525 P.2d at 330. It
should be noted that:
In neither Speer nor Simplot did the court find the accumulated corporate
income itself was a community asset. This means that the wife would not have
been able to will her one-half interest in this asset, and that at the husband's
death, his gift of the shares of stock would also transfer the wife's interest. It
may be impossible to avoid this result in situations involving corporations.
1 MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN, supra note 19, § 3.26 at 3-53.
71. Simplot, 96 Idaho at -, 526 P.2d at 847-48. The husband's proportionate
share (8.4%) of the retained earnings at the start of the marriage in 1953 was $235,269.
In 1971, the retained earnings amounted to $44,230,790; husband's share $4,039,480.
During the marriage the husband's share of the retained earnings increased 88% or
$3,789,090. Id. at _ 526 P.2d at 846.
72. Id. at -' 526 P.2d at 848.
73. Id.
74. Id. at -' 526 P.2d at 846.
75. Id. at , 526 P.2d at 849. Sharidon Simplot contended that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support the trial court's finding of adequate compensation for commu-
nity labor. The Supreme Court of Idaho noted conflicting evidence was presented on
this issue. However, the court also noted "the trial court is the arbiter of conflicting
evidence, and its findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substan-
tial and competent, though conflicting evidence." The court did not disturb the findings
of the trial court on this issue. Id.
Again there were no allegations on the part of Sharidon Simplot that the retention of
earnings was fraudulent or done to deprive the community. Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 848.
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the appellate court to view the retained earnings in a different
light than they did in Speer.
While acknowledging the need to protect the community
from loss of earnings through the use of business organiza-
tions in these two cases, the Idaho court also recognized the
need to protect separate property interests.76 This stance is
not unusual in community property states because of the need
to balance the interests of community and separate estates.77
B. Louisiana
Although Abraham v. Abraham78 involved an unincorpo-
rated business, the Supreme Court of Louisiana's handling of
several issues in that case has had implications in actions in-
volving incorporated businesses. In Abraham, the court was
required to determine the extent of the husband's interest in
the enhanced value of his wife's unincorporated mercantile
business. The wife had played an active role in the manage-
ment of the business during the marriage.79
Several general policies were set forth by the court in
Abraham that have been applied in cases involving incorpo-
rated businesses. First, the court determined that the en-
hanced value of separate property resulting from the
community labor of either spouse should benefit the commu-
nity.80 Initially, there was a question of whether the spouse
requesting a portion of the increase had to establish that that
spouse's labor, as opposed to either spouse's labor, had caused
the increase in value. The court concluded that the request
could be premised on the labor of either spouse."' Second, the
76. Id. at _, 526 P.2d at 848. "[T]he increase in retained earnings in this action
must be considered natural enhancement and not income or rents and profits in order to
preserve the right to own and hold separate property." Id.
77. See infra notes 93, 117, and 127 and accompanying text.
78. 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956).
79. The wife's share of the capital and undivided profits at the commencement of
the marriage was $15,954.53. This figure had increased to $46,824.47 at the time of the
dissolution of the marriage. Abraham, 230 La. at _ 87 So. 2d at 737.
80. Id. at _ 87 So. 2d at 738-39. Courts, at times, have difficulty in determining
what portion of income represents earnings, community property, as opposed to fruits,
which become the wife's separate property if she files an instrument declaring her inten-
tion to reserve these for herself. See Paxton v. Bramlette, 228 So. 2d 161, 163 (La. Ct.
App. 1969).
81. Abraham, 230 La. at _ 87 So. 2d at 738. The court interpreted the words
"common labor", as used in LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2408 (repealed 1980), to mean
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court considered the implications of an earlier case, Beals v.
Fontenot,8 2 which dealt with the increase in value of corporate
stock. Implicit in the Beals decision is the assumption that if
community efforts contributed to the increase in the value of
stock, the non-owning spouse would be entitled to one-half of
such increase.8 3 The court noted that the question was not
whether the spouse had been adequately compensated but
whether the labor had contributed to the increased stock
value.8 4 Finally, the court declared that the "legal status of
the business has no relevancy whatever; the only inquiry is
whether the value of the separate property of a spouse,
whether it be in the form of stock or otherwise, has been en-
hanced by the labor or industry of the community." 85
This last concept was reiterated by the Louisiana Court of
Appeals in Mohr v. Mohr.8 6 Mohr required the court to deter-
mine whether the husband had been adequately compensated
for his labors by the Crescent Cigarette Vending Corpora-
tion.8 7 Crescent, a closely held corporation, was owned and
totally controlled by the husband. 8 Mrs. Mohr contended
that at least part of the enhanced value of the stock was a
result of her husband's management.8 9 In response to Mrs.
Mohr's contention, the court of appeals enumerated four re-
quirements that must be met before the community is entitled
"community labor or industry as the word 'common', as used in the Civil Code is sy-
nonymous with 'community'." Abraham, 230 La. at _, 87 So. 2d at 738 (emphasis in
original).
82. 111 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1940).
83. Abraham, 230 La. at -, 87 So. 2d at 738.
84. Id. at _ 87 So. 2d at 739 n.5.
The court in Abraham indicated that the "[a]pplicability of Article 2408 of the Civil
Code is dependent on" whether community labor contributed to the enhancement of the
separate property and "not upon whether the community has been adequately remuner-
ated by the salary and dividends received." Abraham at _ 87 So.2d at 739 n.5.
Article 2368, which became effective January 1, 1980, concerns the handling of the
increase in value of separate property and discusses reimbursement for "uncompensated
common labor or industry." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2368 (West 1985). See infra
note 93 for text of Article 2368. Article 2368 has been interpreted recently by the Loui-
siana Court of Appeals in McKey v. McKey, 449 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 1984).
85. Abraham, 230 La. at -, 87 So. 2d at 739.
86. 374 So. 2d 203 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
87. Crescent bought out its competitor, Talcott. As one of the conditions for this
sale a $20,000 limitation was placed on Mohr's annual salary by Talcott. In addition,





to reimbursement for the enhanced value of the husband's
separate property:
[(1)] that the improvements did in fact enhance the property;
(2) that the improvements were made with community funds
or joint labor; (3) the value at the commencement and disso-
lution of the community; and (4) that the enhancement did
not result from the ordinary course of events, i.e. a natural
appreciation of immovable property .... 90
Once the spouse asserting the right of reimbursement for the
community establishes that community labor contributed to
an increase in the value of the separate property, the burden
shifts to the owning spouse to establish that the increase was
the result of "the ordinary course of things." 91 The result of
this process has been referred to as an all or nothing approach.
If the spouse was successful in establishing that the increase in
value was due to "the ordinary course of things," all of the
increase would be separate. If the spouse were unsuccessful,
all would be community property. 92 Since it was amended in
1980, the Louisiana Civil Code now calls for an apportion-
ment of increase in value of separate property resulting from
uncompensated community labor.93
The court noted that the fact that Mohr's salary had been
limited as a condition of Crescent's acquisition of a competitor
did not mean that the salary represented "a fair return for the
labors expended . . . . Directions were given to the trial
court to determine the "real value of Mohr's labors" and to
"accord credit for one half of same to appellant. ' 95 In making
90. Id. (quoting Fontenot v. Fontenot, 339 So. 2d 897, 901 (La. Ct. App. 1976)).
91. Abraham, 230 La. at _, 87 So. 2d at 739 (emphasis in original). See also
Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d 793, 797-98 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
92. When the owning spouse had to establish that the enhancement was "due only
to the ordinary course of things rise in values or chances of trade" the failure to do so
resulted in the entire enhancement belonging to the community. This has been referred
to as "an all or nothing proposition." Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d 1096, 1101 (La.
Ct. App. 1981) (emphasis in original).
93. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2368 (West 1985) provides:
If the separate property of a spouse has increased in value as a result of the
uncompensated common labor or industry of the spouses, the other spouse is
entitled to be reimbursed from the spouse whose property has increased in value
one-half of the increase attributed to the common labor.
Id. The comments to Article 2368 indicate that "[t]o the extent that a spouse is compen-
sated for his labor, no reimbursement is due." Id.
94. Mohr, 374 So. 2d at 205.
95. Id. at 205-06.
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this determination the court noted that "the corporate entity
has no particular significance. '96
C. Texas
Vallone v. Vallone97 and Jensen v. Jensen98 are two recent
Texas cases concerning the enhanced value of close corpora-
tions. Both cases have prompted a number of articles which
attempt to analyze their impact on Texas law.99 Both are in
sharp contrast to an earlier Texas Court of Appeals case, Bell
v. Bell.100
It is important when reading the majority's opinion in Val-
lone to remember that the only issue under consideration was
whether the trial court had abused its discretion in dividing
the property at dissolution.101 The majority did not consider
the issue of whether the property had been properly classified
by the trial court. Therefore, they never reached the question
of whether the increase in value of the corporation was sepa-
rate or community property. This is an important distinction
and one which the dissent in Vallone was quick to point
96. Id. at 206.
97. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1983), rev'g 618 S.W.2d 820 (rex. Civ. App. 1981).
98. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). Care must be used when reviewing materials per-
taining to or citing Jensen. The case has generated one opinion from the Texas Court of
Appeals, 629 S.W.2d 222 (rex. Civ. App. 1982) and three opinions from the Texas
Supreme Court, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 480 (July 6, 1983), opinion withdrawn; 27 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 68 (Nov. 9, 1983), opinion withdrawn; 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). The three
Texas Supreme Court opinions in Jensen are sometimes referred to as Jensen I, II, and
III.
99. See generally Weekley, Appreciation of a Closely Held Business Interest Owned
Prior to Marriage: Is It Separate or Community Property? A Texas Update, 11 COMM.
PROP. J., 257 (1984) (discussion of Vallone and Jensen I, II, III); Weekley I, supra note
4 (Texas law prior to Vallone); Enhancement of Stock Value, supra note 4 (discussion of
Texas law prior to Jensen III).
100. 504 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.
1979). The court of civil appeals of Texas had remanded the Bell case to the trial court
with directions to consider the increase in value of the corporate assets when dividing
the property at divorce. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of civil ap-
peals's decision finding that the trial court did not fail to take the corporations into
consideration when making the division of property. The trial court, in the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Texas, had awarded the corporations to the husband in the exer-
cise of its discretion.
101. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 457. "The case comes to us in the following posture:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ignoring community rights and equities which
might have existed in the corporation?" Id.
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out.10 2 Nevertheless, the Vallone majority opinion did clarify
a few issues.
At the center of the controversy in Vallone was a restau-
rant which was initially operated as a sole proprietorship and
incorporated after the marriage. 0 3 Initial capitalization of the
restaurant was $19,663. At the time of the trial, the restau-
rant constituted the "major asset of both the community es-
tate and the husband's separate estate" and was valued at one
million dollars. °4 Of this one million, $700,000 represented
retained earnings. 0 5 Mr. Vallone had received $200,000 a
year from the corporation as compensation. 0 6 Forty-seven
percent of the corporate stock was awarded to Mr. Vallone
and seventy percent of the remaining fifty-three percent of the
stock was awarded to Mrs. Vallone "as her share of the com-
munity interest in the corporation. .... -. o7
It was Mrs. Vallone's contention that the corporation had
been operated as her husband's alter ego, 0 8 the implication
being that the corporate veil could be pierced on this basis,
thus allowing the community access to the corporation's en-
hanced value. This theory had been used successfully in ear-
lier Texas cases dealing with corporations under similar
circumstances. 0 9 In this instance, the trial court decided that
the corporation was not the husband's alter ego."10
In addition to her claim that the corporation was her hus-
band's alter ego,"' Mrs. Vallone requested reimbursement" 2
102. Id. at 460 (Sondock, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 457. The restaurant had been owned by the husband's father as a sole
proprietorship. After his marriage in 1966, the husband worked at the restaurant for
his father. In 1969, the father transferred the restaurant's assets to the husband as a gift
The restaurant was incorporated in 1969. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 464 n.7. The husband's records indicated the figure of $700,000 as re-
tained earnings.
106. Id. at 457.
107. Id. The 47% figure represented that portion of the initial capitalization
($19,663) represented by the husband's separate property ($9,365 worth of used restau-
rant equipment gifted to the husband). Id.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d 459 (rex. Ct. App. 1968).
See also Bell, 504 S.W.2d at 612 (Keith, J., dissenting) (dissent voiced opposition to the
majority's finding that the enhanced value was community property in light of the trial
court's finding that the corporation was not the husband's alter ego).
110. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 457.
111. Id. at 458.
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if it was found that her husband's separate estate had been
unjustly enriched at the community's expense. 113 A prior
Texas case, Hale v. Hale,"4 "held that a contribution of com-
munity labor should not be taken into account in determining
the amount of reimbursement that may be owing to the com-
munity by the benefited separate estate."' 1 5 While disapprov-
ing of the exclusion in Hale of community time, talent and
labor as factors to be considered in determining the amount of
reimbursement, the court in Vallone refused to find that these
factors entitled the community to reimbursement. 16
Although the majority did not expressly state that it con-
sidered the community to have been adequately compensated,
the language of the opinion seems to imply just that. Specifi-
cally, the court noted that reimbursement is "premised on un-
compensated time, talent or labor" and further that the "right
of reimbursement arises when the funds or assets of one estate
are used to benefit and enhance another estate without itself
receiving some benefit.""' 7 By implication, it would appear
that the court considered the community to be compensated
for the husband's labor.
The dissent in Vallone viewed the facts of this case in a far
different light than did the majority. The dissent noted that if
the restaurant had been run as a sole proprietorship, the entire
increase in value would have been community property." 8
This same view was expressed in Bell, where the Texas Court
of Appeals stated that "it wouldbe unreasonable to apply one
rule to an individually owned situation and another to a cor-
112. The spouse seeking reimbursement has the burden of pleading and proving the
amount of the contribution and the enhanced value. See Wachendorfer v.
Wachendorfer, 615 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
113. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 457-58.
114. 557 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Hale was disapproved in Vallone to
the extent that it "held that the expenditure of community time, talent and labor may
under no circumstances give rise to an equitable right of reimbursement in the commu-
nity's favor, .... ." Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459.
115. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 457.
116. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459. The possibility of reimbursement for community
labor which resulted in the increase in value of a spouse's separate property was alluded
to in dicta in Wachendorfer, 615 S.W.2d at 855.
117. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 463-64 (Sondock, J., dissenting).
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porately owned situation."'1 9 In the opinion of Justice
Sondock, the majority in Vallone had elevated form over sub-
stance by allowing a spouse to transform community earnings
to separate property "by a simple ex parte paper transaction
",120
The concept of a court being able to fix "adequate com-
pensation" for the labors of the spouse was also criticized in
the Vallone dissent. Justice Sondock pointed out that what an
an individual or court might view as "adequate" could be far
below what is actually received as income. He stated his im-
pression of the rule concerning earnings during marriage be-
mg community property as applying to "all of the earnings"
and not only the "portion of the earnings found to be ade-
quate compensation .... 121
Despite Justice Sondock's strong dissent in Vallone, when
the court was faced squarely with the need to decide the char-
acter of the increase in value of a corporation, it chose to ac-
knowledge the corporate entity and allow only adequate
compensation to the community in Jensen III.122 According
to the findings of the trial court in Jensen, there was no ques-
tion that the husband's role was the key to the success of RLJ
Printing Company, Inc. 123 RLJ Printing Company, Inc. had
been acquired by the husband four months before his mar-
riage and was the holding company for all the stock in News-
paper Enterprise, Inc., which was acquired sixty-four days
before the marriage. 124 The trial court had found that the
RLJ Printing Company, Inc. was not the alter ego of the hus-
band and was not created in fraud of the community estate's
rights. 25
Finding that the trial court's decision regarding the rea-
sonableness of the husband's compensation was based on in-
adequate support, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the
119. Bell, 504 S.W.2d at 611. "Whe trial court shall take into consideration the
increase in value of the corporate assets by reason of the business transacted through
such corporation during the term of the marriage. This rule is not founded upon fraud,
but rather upon the broad principle of equity." Id. at 611-12.
120. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 465 (Sondock, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 461 (emphasis supplied).
122. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 107.





case for retrial on that issue. 126 In doing so, the court set out
guidelines for the trial court concerning the rights of the com-
munity if the compensation was found to be inadequate.
These guidelines are an attempt to indicate the extent of the
community's interest in any increase in value of the corpora-
tion over the length of the marriage.
The court first briefly examined the underlying differences
between the right to reimbursement theory and the commu-
nity ownership theory, and concluded that the "reimburse-
ment theory more nearly affords justice to both the
community and separate estates." 12 7 Next the court set out a
formula to be used to ensure protection for the interests of
both estates.
[T]he community will be reimbursed for the value of time
and effort expended by either or both spouses to enhance the
separate estate of either, other than that reasonably neces-
sary to manage and preserve the separate estate, less the re-
muneration received for that time and effort in the form of
salary, bonus, dividends and other fringe benefits, those
items being community property when received.1 28
D. Comparisons
It is obvious from the review of cases in these three states
that they view the issue of the increased value of a spouse's
separate property interest in a close corporation from different
perspectives. Louisiana's position of considering the legal sta-
tus of the business to be of no relevance 129 appears diametri-
cally opposed to the respect Texas seems to pay the corporate
126. Id. at 110. Compensation from 1976 to 1979 consisted of salary, bonuses and
dividends equalling respectively: $64,065.97; $95,426.00; $106,143.00; and $115,000.00.
Id. at 108. The trial court's finding was based on the opinion of an expert in the field of
corporate evaluation whose opinion concerning the husband's compensation was based
on the husband's percentage of stock ownership. The supreme court concluded that the
correct measure is whether the "salary, bonuses and dividends received by the commu-
nity" was reasonable compensation for the husband's "time, toil and effort ..... Id.
at 110.
127. Id. at 109. The court also concluded the reimbursement theory is consistent
with the laws of Texas and that the "status of the property is to be determined by the
origin of the title to the property, and not by the acquisition of the final title." Id. The
former is referred to as the inception of title theory and the latter is sometimes referred
to as the source of funds theory.
128. Id.
129. Abraham, 230 La. at _, 87 So. 2d at 739.
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entity, minus a showing of fraud or alter ego. 130 It must be
remembered, however, that cases of this kind tend to be very
fact oriented. 131
While there are differences in treatment among these
states, there are similarities as well. Each state speaks of reim-
bursing the contributing estate for its uncompensated effort;'M
reimbursement as opposed to creating an ownership interest
in the benefited estate. 133 Each is concerned that the commu-
nity has been compensated in some way for the efforts ex-
pended on the separate property. The concept of adequate
compensation, despite the difficulties in determining what is
adequate, concides with basic principles of community prop-
erty law. Each estate must be protected from encroachment
by the other. Therefore, the contributing estate is entitled to
be compensated for its efforts and no more. 134
How will Wisconsin deal with these issues when they arise
in the context of a divorce action? Will the aforesaid decisions
from Idaho, Louisiana and Texas form a backdrop against
which those in Wisconsin are played? A brief look at a few of
the differences between Wisconsin and these three states is
necessary before attempting to answer these questions.
III. WISCONSIN
A. Equitable Distribution
Today Wisconsin, which is referred to as an equitable dis-
tribution common-law state,135 bases its divorce statutes, in
part, on community property principles. 136 Although begin-
130. Featherston & Trail, supra note 8, at 133.
131. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, § 6:18, at 359.
132. See supra notes 62, 90 and 117 and accompanying text.
133. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at §§ 6:6, 6:7. "If ownership is determined
by the inception of title doctrine, subsequent payments in the acquisition process usually
give rise to a right of reimbursement to the 'other' estate, but do not change the charac-
ter of the ownership." Id. at § 6:6, at 337. This is in comparison with "co-ownership by
the separate and community estates according to their respective contributions." Id. at
§ 6:7, at 338.
134. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, § 6:18, at 359.
135. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 17 FAM. LAW
Q., 391 (Winter 1984) [hereinafter cited as Freed & Walker].
136. Wisconsin divorce law is based upon the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
Dixon v. Dixon, 107 Wis. 2d 492, 499 n.6, 319 N.W.2d 846, 850 n.6 (1982). The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act's proposal for division of property is in substance a
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ning in 1986 Wisconsin will become a community property
state, 137 distribution of property at the dissolution of the mar-
riage will remain unchanged. Distribution will be equitable
but not necessarily equal. 138 This is an important distinction
to remember when considering case law from the civil law
states. Louisiana divides property along "equal in value"' 139
lines, while Idaho and Texas divide property along equitable
lines. 14°
Although it might appear that Wisconsin, Idaho and
Texas would handle the distribution of property upon divorce
in a like manner, the results in these states could be far differ-
ent. In Idaho, "the court has no power to divide or assign the
"1141separate property of one spouse to the other spouse ....
In a recent Texas case, Cameron v. Cameron, 42 the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that separate property could not be
distributed to the non-owning spouse in a division of property
at dissolution. 143 Wisconsin, in contrast, allows the court to
include property of a spouse that was gifted or inherited in the
hotchpot to be divided if the failure to do so would cause
hardship to the other spouse or the children. 44
community property rule. Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property
in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REv. 165, 166 (1976).
137. See supra notes 10 to 24 and accompanying text.
138. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84).
139. Freed & Walker, supra note 135, at 390. See also MCCLANAHAN, supra note
5, at § 12:7, at 536.
140. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at § 12:11, at 541. Idaho provides for an equita-
ble distribution. Id. at § 12:13, at 543-44. Texas courts have wide discretion to deter-
mine an equitable division.
141. Id. at § 12:3, at 528 and at § 12:17, at 556-57.
142. 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982).
143. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d at 213. "Allowing a trial court to divest separate prop-
erty from one spouse and award it to the other spouse as part of the latter's separate
estate would impermissibly enlarge the exclusive constitutional definition of separate
property." Id.
See also 2 MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN, supra note 19, §§ 11.1-.2(a) at
11-2 to 11-4. (Louisiana and Idaho also award separate property to its owner).
144. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84). Community property states are not consis-
tent on the issue of which property may be divided at the time of divorce.
There has always been considerable variation in the laws of the community-
property states as to the power of the court to divide, or assign, or otherwise deal
with the separate property of the spouses in divorce proceedings. . . . In New
Mexico. . . and Washington, the court has power to divide or assign the sepa-
rate property of one spouse to the other spouse, but there are circumstances in
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An additional factor to remember is that the Wisconsin
statute section dealing with divorce makes no mention of in-
dividual, separate, property. The only property excluded
from division at the time of divorce is that which was "a gift,
bequest, devise or inheritance" acquired prior to or during the
marriage or property acquired with the proceeds from such
property.1 45 The type of property excluded from division in
Wisconsin constitutes only a portion of the type of property
classified as separate and, therefore, excludable, in Idaho,
Louisiana and Texas.1 46 Property a spouse brings into the
marriage is also classified as separate in Idaho, Louisiana and
Texas; thus, the amount of property that could be excluded in
these three states is, potentially, larger than that which could
be excludable in Wisconsin.1 47
This brief comparison indicates that there is no one state
which precisely matches Wisconsin's approach to handling
property at divorce. This is not to imply that Wisconsin
courts should ignore the way community property states deal
with various issues; in light of the differences pointed out
above, caution should be exercised.
Current Wisconsin case law may indicate an inclination of
the courts to be thinking in terms of community property
which this power is limited. In Nevada, the power of the court is limited to
certain situations and the cases appear not to have been consistent in this area.
MCCLANHAN, supra note 5, § 12:3, at 528.
In Washington, the statutory power to assign separate property in a divorce
decree appears unlimited.
In New Mexico, the power to deal with separate property is an integral part
of the statute dealing with alimony and limits the use of separate property to the
satisfaction of orders for alimony and support.
Id. at § 12:3, at 528 n.19. It should be remembered, however, that Washington "treats
both inherited property and property brought to the marriage in the same manner as
separate property." 2 MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN, supra note 19,
§ 11.2(a), at 11-4.
145. Wis. STAT. § 767.255. It should be noted that this property may be divided
"upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship on the other
party or on the children of the marriage. Id. See also, supra note 19 and accom-
panying text.
146. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, § 4:10, at 188, 190. The statute sections of
Idaho, Louisiana and Texas defining separate property vary. However, all three states
define property acquired by gift or inheritance as well as property brought to the mar-
riage as separate. See IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2341
(West 1979); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975).
147. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, § 4:10, at 188, 190.
1985]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
principles already. This is apparent in two recent Wisconsin
cases, Plachta v. Plachta148 and Arneson v. Arneson. 4 9 Neither
of these cases, however, deal directly with the question of the
enhanced value which consists of both income and natural ap-
preciation components of a closely held corporation.
B. Plachta and Arneson
The sole issue in Plachta was "whether the appreciated
value of a home gifted to Margaret Plachta during her mar-
riage is a marital asset subject to property division."' 150 The
court of appeals in Plachta speaks of the inflation in the value
of the home as having the same character as the home because
it was "due to the general economic conditions of inflation
and the normal appreciation of real estate."1 5' In all of the
community property states the results as to the characteriza-
tion of the property would have been the same as the Wiscon-
sin court's in Plachta.152 In addition, the finding in Plachta
corresponds to one of the two general principles of commu-
nity property law mentioned at the beginning of this article:
the intrinsic increase in value of separate property remains
separate. 153
Arneson involved shares in a closely held corporation. In
Arneson the court of appeals was concerned primarily with
purchases made with the dividends of shares gifted to the hus-
band. 5 4 The issue in Arneson, as framed by the court of ap-
peals, was "whether other property purchased with the
dividend income generated by an excluded asset should also
148. 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1984).
149. 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
150. Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d at 330, 348 N.W.2d at 194.
151. Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d at 334, 348 N.W.2d at 196. The court did point out that
this increase in value would still be sujbect to division upon a showing of hardship. Id.
at 333-34, 348 N.W.2d at 195-96.
152. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, § 6:18, at 357.
153. Id. at 359. Chapter 766 would also classify the increased value as individual,
separate, property because it was acquired "[flrom appreciation of the spouse's individ-
ual property except to the extent that the appreciation is classified as marital property
under § 766.63." Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(c). (this section corresponds to § 4(g)(3) of
UMPA).
154. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d at 242, 355 N.W.2d at 19. The husband owned 250
shares, 100 of which were a gift from his father. Id. at 240, 355 N.W.2d at 18.
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be excluded from the marital estate?"15 The court's answer
was that the property so acquired should not be excluded.
156
In Arneson, the trial court wrote in terms of classifying the
purchases made with the "fruits" of the husband's gifted and
inherited property. 57 The court of appeals found that "in-
come generated by an asset" is not only "separate and distinct
from the asset itself," but it is also "separate and distinct from
the appreciation of the asset." '158 The income was held to be
marital property. 159 This finding would correspond with those
states following the civil law system in which all income is
community whether it is generated from separate or commu-
nity property. 16 In states following the American rule, on the
other hand, the income would have been held to be separate
because it was generated from separate property. 161
The closely held corporation hypothetical posed at the be-
ginning of this article is not dealt with directly by either
Plachta or Arneson. Plachta deals with the appreciation of an
excluded asset 162 and Arneson deals with income generated by
an excluded asset.16 3 Neither case provides a method for de-
termining what portion of the enhanced value of an excluded
asset represents natural appreciation and what portion re-
sulted from the uncompensated efforts of a spouse.
The courts may find that Chapter 766 is of help in this
situation. Chapter 766 was not intended to have an effect on
decisions concerning property at the time of divorce. The
prefatory note to UMPA emphasized that UMPA was meant
only to confirm ownership in property. 164
The Act [UMPA] takes the parties "to the door of the
divorce court" only. It leaves to existing dissolution proce-
dures in the several states the selection of the appropriate
155. Id. at 242, 355 N.W.2d at 19.
156. Id. at 245, 355 N.W.2d at 20.
157. Id. at 241, 355 N.W.2d at 18.
158. Id. at 244, 355 N.W.2d at 20.
159. Id. at 245, 355 N.W.2d at 20.
160. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, § 6:12 at 344-45. Wis. STAT. § 766.31(4), as
amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 37 would provide for the same result.
161. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 28, at 132. This would be the outcome in Cali-
fornia, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and Washington. Id.
162. Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d at 330, 348 N.W.2d at 194.
163. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d at 242, 355 N.W.2d at 19.
164. Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at 47.
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procedure for dividing property. On the other hand, the Act
[UMPA] has the function of confirming the ownership of
property as the couple enters the process. Thus reallocation
of property derived from the effort of both spouses during
the marriage starts from a basis of the equal undivided own-
ership that the spouses share in their marital property.
165
Although the provisions of Chapter 766 were not intended
to affect parties once they were on the other side of the door of
the divorce court, Wisconsin courts may find section
766.63(2) to be a useful tool in determining how to handle the
enhanced value of a closely held corporation.
165. Id. (emphasis in original).
William P. Cantwell, who served as Reporter to the Drafting Committee of the
Uniform Marital Property Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, recently discussed the intent of the drafters of the Act in regard to
divorce:
Articulation with respect to divorce property division procedures is essen-
tially handled by going to the door of the divorce court but not through it. The
drafters foresaw the opportunity for adopting jurisdictions to leave their existing
procedures entirely in place. If an adopting jurisdiction already allowed the
court to divide all property of the spouses, then that plan would continue, and
the marital property would simply be part of that universe of divisible assets.
For example, if a given state's procedure had a lesser reach, such as a defined
type of divorce-only marital property, that could easily be integrated with
UMPA. The important point, from the drafter's perspective, was to permit com-
plete latitude and not to urge in any respect that marital property must necessar-
ily be divided in precisely equal ratios, unless that was already the preference of
an adopting state.
Cantwell, The Uniform Marital Property Act: Origin and Intent, 68 MARQ. L. REV.
383, 387 (1985) (emphasis in original).
In addition, 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 141 repeals Wis. STAT. § 766.75 (1983-84) (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1986). Section 766.75 concerned the treatment of property at the time of the
dissolution of the marriage. The note to 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 141 states:
NOTE: Repeals the provision of Act 186, which is also contained in UMPA,
stating: "[i]n a dissolution, all property then owned by either or both spouses
which was acquired during marriage and before the determination date and
which would have been marital property under this chapter if acquired after the
determination date shall be treated as if it were marital property."
The repealed language raised questions about the effect of Act 186 on s.
767.255, relating to property division at divorce, annulment or legal separation.
The special committee concluded that neither UMPA nor Act 186, by including
the repealed language, intends to affect existing law that applies to property divi-
sion at dissolution of a marriage. See the comment to UMPA, section 17. The
special committee concluded, therefore, that, while the repealed provision may
have some conceptual and psychological value, it should be repealed to avoid
any confusion about whether ch. 766 affects the court's equitable powers to di-
vide the property of spouses under § 767.255.
1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 141 note.
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C. Wisconsin Statute Section 766.63(2)166
One section that may be significant in a consideration of
the issue at hand is section 766.63(2):
Application by one spouse of substantial labor, effort, inven-
tiveness, physical or intellectual skill, creativity or manage-
rial activity to either spouse's property other than marital
property creates marital property attributable to that appli-
cation if both of the following apply:
(a) Reasonable compensation is not received for the
application;
(b) Substantial appreciation of the property results from the
application. 167
It should be noted that this section varies slightly from the
version in UMPA. Wisconsin provides that the labor of one
spouse to either spouse's property can create marital property
if certain conditions are not met, whereas the UMPA version
provides for this outcome only where the labor of one spouse
is applied to the "individual property of the other spouse."168
Thus, under UMPA's version it would appear that a spouse
would be free to devote time and effort to his or her own indi-
vidual property without incurring obligations to the other
spouse. 169 Wisconsin rejected this approach. 70  This varia-
tion, while significant, will not affect a comparison of section
766.63(2) with the corresponding section in UMPA, section
14.
166. Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2) (1983-84) (effective Jan. 1, 1986), as amended by 1985
Wis. Laws 37.
167. Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2), as amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 37. The phrase "indi-
vidual property" in the introduction to § 766.63(2) was amended to read property
"other than marital property." The~classification "other than marital property" would
include both individual property and property referred to as deferred marital property.
The legislative note accompanying 1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 129 provides:
NOTE: Clarifies that the appreciation rule applies to either spouse's prop-
erty other than marital property, rather than solely to either spouse's individual
property. The clarification is significant since it expands the pool of property to
which the appreciation rules applies. According to members of the UMPA
drafting committee, reference to "individual property" in UMPA is in error; it
was intended that the rule apply to all of the spouse's property other than mari-
tal property, not just individual property.
1985 Wis. Laws 37, § 129 note.
168. UMPA § 14, reprinted in Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at 65-67 (em-
phasis added).
169. But see Suggested Revisions, supra note 12, at 703 (critical of this result).
170. Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2), as amended by 1985 Wis. Law 37.
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For the non-owning spouse attempting to tap the in-
creased value of a closely held corporation, section 766.63(2)
could provide the means. The non-owning spouse would have
the burden of establishing three elements. 171 First, the effort
applied to the individual property must be proven to have
been substantial. "Routine, normal, and usual effort is not
substantial."' 172 The need to establish that the effort was sub-
stantial follows community property principles which allow a
spouse the opportunity to preserve his or her separate estate
without incurring an obligation to the community. 173 Second,
the appreciation of the property must not only be proven to
have been substantial, but it must also be due to a spouse's
efforts. 174  In order for the rights of the community to arise,
the increase in value must be attributable to the efforts of a
spouse and not to natural appreciation. If the increase in
171. UMPA § 14 comment, reprinted in Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at
66. Comments to § 14 of UMPA, which correspond to section 766.63, contain a refer-
ence regarding who bears the burden of proof in establishing the status of property. "A
spouse claiming a particular classification for an asset contrary to the general presump-
tion of Section 4(b) will have the burden of proof on that claim, and failure to meet it
would render any mixing issue moot." Id. at 66.
Attorney Richard J. Langer, a member of the law firm of Stolper, Koritzinsky,
Brewster & Neider, S.C., Madison, Wisconsin, and frequent lecturer for the State Bar of
Wisconsin on the subject of Wisconsin's Marital Property Act, has questioned the
meaning and consequence of the reference in the comments to § 14 to § 4(b) of UMPA.
Mr. Langer has questioned whether this reference results in the burden of proof being
on the spouse claiming the property and its appreciation as separate rather than on the
spouse claiming the property as marital. The general presumption mentioned in § 4(b)
is that all property is marital. If all property is presumed marital, then the spouse
claiming otherwise would bear the burden of proof. The question arises as to who
would bear the burden of proof on the underlying asset and the appreciation. In the
first instance, the one asserting a classification in opposition to the general presumption
that all property is marital would bear the burden. Once that burden is met and the
property is classified as separate, or individual, the next issue becomes the classification
of the appreciation of the property. Attorney Richard Langer has suggested the follow-
ing as the possible answer to this problem: The underlying asset would have to be
established as individual first because of the general presumption. The appreciation
would initially be classified as marital property again because of the general presump-
tion. Section 766.31(7)(c) would statutorily reverse the general presumption and class-
ify the appreciation as individual. If this were to occur, the spouse wishing to classify
the appreciation as marital would bear the burden of proof.
Telephone interview with Attorney Richard J. Langer, Madison, WI. (August 12,
1985). See infra note 175 for the text of § 766.31(7)(c).
172. UMPA § 14 comment, reprinted in Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at
66.
173. See REPPy & SAMUEL, supra note 28, at 156.
174. Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at 66.
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value were due to the latter, the appreciation would remain
the spouse's individual property.175 Distinguishing the cause
of the increase in value is also an important factor in commu-
nity property states.176  Finally, reasonable compensation
must not have been received. Again the concept of reasonable
compensation is one which is familiar to commumity property
states in cases involving the claims of one estate against the
other. 177
Therefore, in a case involving the enhanced value of a
spouse's separate property interest in a closely held corpora-
tion, if section 766.63(2) would be considered by the court at
dissolution, it would appear that in order to share in the in-
creased value at dissolution the non-owning spouse would
have to establish that:
1) Either of the spouses applied substantial effort to the
corporation;
2) A substantial increase in the value of the corporation
was due to this effort, and;
3) Reasonable compensation was not received.
What would be the results if the non-owning spouse were
able to prove all three elements? The language of section
766.63(2) indicates that the application of substantial, uncom-
pensated labor "creates marital property attributable to that
application."' 178 According to the Comments to section 14 of
UMPA, the term "creates marital property" means that an
interest in the asset is granted to the marital property estate
and not that a right of reimbursement has arisen.179 The crea-
175. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 30, at § 73.
This principle is stated in section 766.31(7)(c) which provides:
(7) Property acquired by a spouse during marriage and after the determina-
tion date is individual property if acquired by any of the following means:
(c) From appreciation of the spouse's individual property except to the ex-
tent that the appreciation is classified as marital property under § 766.63.
Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(c).
176. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 30, at § 73.
177. See supra notes 63, 64, 90, 117 and accompanying text.
178. Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2), as amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 37 (emphasis added).
179. UMPA § 14 comment, reprinted in Informational Bulletin, supra note 11, at
66 (emphasis deleted). The term "creates marital property" means that the right is to
an interest in the asset and not to a right of reimbursement. Id. "As the marital prop-
erty component rises and falls in value, the interest rises and falls." Id.
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tion of an ownership interest is not the same as a right to re-
imbursement, which is the approach taken in the three
community property states reviewed in this article. A right of
reimbursement does not create an ownership interest in the
asset.180 Professor Reppy has criticized the creation of an
ownership interest as being inappropriate in situations involv-
ing corporations. s18
By carrying the burden of proof as to the three elements
encompassed in section 766.63(2) the non-owning spouse
could, conceivably, receive a proportionate share in the asset
corresponding to the labor expended."l 2 If, however, the non-
owning spouse failed to prove any one of these elements, it
would appear that no portion of the property would be classi-
fied as marital. In the latter situation, the non-owning spouse
would, presumably, be entitled only to a share of the compen-
sation already received." 3
180. See Jensen, 644 S.W.2d at 109 for a brief discussion of the difference between
the "reimbursement" and "community ownership theories."
181. Suggested Revisions, supra note 12, at 705. Professor Reppy refers to this as
"buying in" by the improving estate. "The estate thereby acquires a percentage of own-
ership, apparently equal to the value of the contributed labor or property compared to
the prior unadjusted basis in the property of the improved estate." Id.
182. In a speech presented at the 1985 Annual Convention of State Bar of Wiscon-
sin, Attorney Keith A. Christiansen, a member of the law firm of Foley & Lardner,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a co-author of MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN,
suggested that the general rules concerning classification of property would apply to the
stock or partnership interest of a corporation or partnership and "apparently not to
underlying business assets." Christiansen, Application of Marital Property to Manage-
ment of a Small Business, 1985 ANNUAL CONVENTION 411 (June 19-21, 1985).
183. Professor Reppy notes that "UMPA simply ignores the corporate veil prob-
lem." Suggested Revisions, supra note 12, at 703.
Another section of Chapter 766 which may be helpful to the non-owning spouse is
section 766.31(4) which provides that "[e]xcept as provided under subs. (7)(a), (7p) and
(10), income earned or accrued by a spouse or attributable to property of a spouse
during marriage and after the determination date is marital property." Wis. STAT.
§ 766.31(4), as amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 37. The issue would be whether the in-
crease in value of a closely held corporation could be classified as "income earned or
accrued" that is "attributable to property of a spouse," or classified as appreciation of
individual property of the spouse. In the first instance, the increase would be termed
marital. WIs. STAT. § 766.31(4). In the second, the increase would be the individual
property of the owning spouse. Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(c). Again the burden would
appear to be on the non-owning spouse attempting to classify the increase in value as




In the past, Wisconsin courts have considered issues relat-
ing to closely held corporations at the time of divorce.' 8 4 Re-
cently, courts in Wisconsin have dealt with the appreciation of
an excluded asset 18' and income from an excluded asset.1 86
The question of how to deal with the enhanced value of an
excluded asset when that value potentially includes both natu-
ral appreciation and labor remains unanswered.
What will the courts do when faced with this last issue? A
review of cases from Idaho, Louisiana and Texas may be help-
ful in gaining an understanding of the issues involved. It is
hoped that when an interest in a closely held corporation is
involved in a divorce action, courts will not restrict them-
selves to labeling the enhanced value as only natural apprecia-
tion, which would be separate, or "fruits", which would be
marital. Instead, it is hoped that courts will consider the
rights of both separate and marital estates. If a consideration
of the interests of both estates is undertaken, section 766.63(2)
could provide the divorce court with the rationale to appor-
tion the enhanced value.
PEGGY L. PODELL
184. See Wahl v. Wahl, 39 Wis. 2d 510, 159 N.W.2d 651 (1968); Whitman v. Whit-
man, 34 Wis. 2d 341, 149 N.W.2d 529 (1967) (court discussed factors to consider in
determining the value of stock of a closely-held corporation).
185. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
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